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Media Malpractice: The Legal Risks of Voluntary
Social Responsibility in Mass Communication
Robert E. Drechsel*
The concept of social responsibility has become enmeshed
strongly in the fabric of American mass communication. There is
an extensive and growing literature on media ethics;1 media codes
and policy statements abound.2 Premised on the idea that self-reg-
ulation can effectively preempt external regulation and that the
media-particularly the news media-are imbued with a public
trust, social responsibility theory posits that press freedom "can
remain a right of those who publish only if it incorporates into it-
self the right of the citizen and the public interest."' As articulated
in 1947 by the Commission on Freedom of the Press, social respon-
sibility theory holds that freedom of the press "can only continue
as an accountable freedom," that its "legal right will stand unal-
tered as its moral duty is performed," and that there is a point
beyond which the media's failure to behave responsibly will re-
quire intervention by the state."
* Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of
Wisconsin-Madison. B.A. (1971), M.A. (1976), Ph.D. (1980), University of Minnesota. The
author wishes to thank his graduate student and research assistant, Deborah Barber, for her
excellent contributions to this project. Funding for the research was provided by the Gradu-
ate School Research Committee at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. See, e.g., C. CHRISTIANS, K. ROTZOLL & M. FACKLER, MEDIA ETHICS (2d ed. 1987);
RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM (D. Elliott ed. 1986); C. FINK, MEDIA ETHICS IN THE NEWSROOM AND
BEYOND (1988); E. GOODWIN, GROPING FOR ETHICS IN JOURNALISM (1983); THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE PRESS (G. Gross ed. 1966); J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES (2d ed. 1985); E.
LAMBETH, COMMITTED JOURNALISM (1986) [hereinafter LAMBTH]; J. MERRILL & S. ODELL,
PHILOSOPHY AND JOURNALISM (1983); ETHICS AND THE PRESS (J. Merrill & R. Barney eds.
1975); P. MEYER, ETHICAL JOURNALISM (1987); W. RIVERS, W. SCHRAMM & C. CHRISTIANS, RE-
SPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS
COMMUNICATION]; B. SWAIN, REPORTERS' ETHICS (1978).
2. For a compilation of a number of codes, see RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICA-
TION, supra note 1, at 289.
3. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 18 (1947).
4. Id. at 19, 131. See also W. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A FRAMEWORK OF PRIN-
CIPLE 166 (1947). The Commission, funded primarily by Time, Inc., consisted of Robert M.
Hutchins, Zechariah Chafee Jr., John M. Clark, John Dickinson, William E. Hocking, Har-
old D. Lasswell, Archibald MacLeish, Charles E. Merriam, Reinhold Niebuhr, Robert Red-
field, Beardsley Rural, Arthur M. Schlesinger and George N. Shuster.
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Clearly, acceptance of some notion of the press as trustee of the
public has become widespread. This notion is reflected not only in
ethics codes,5 but in such concepts as the news media as the
Fourth Estate or as public watchdog or as an essential instrument
of self-government.
Social responsibility theory has been criticized on grounds that it
could boomerang, and with disastrous results. Journalist Lyle Den-
niston, for example, has warned that the law is beginning to use
the press' own claims of being a public servant as justification for
more regulation.6 Professor William Van Alstyne has expressed
concern that critics of the press will be handed "a weapon forged
by the press itself every time it seeks to extend press entitlements
as the surrogate of the public right to know."'7 Such criticism
tracks closely with Ronald Dworkin's larger analysis of the risk of
what he calls a "policy-based" rationale for freedom of expression.
Such a rationale focuses on the value of speech for its audience.
The problem, Dworkin argues, is that an audience-based rationale
opens the door to restriction in the name of the public interest.8 As
Professor Edmund Lambeth puts it, the Commission on Freedom
of the Press "philosophically brought utilitarianism under the me-
dia tent whether the ringmasters of the press noticed or not."9
This article analyzes the risks presented by voluntary social re-
sponsibility. It does so in the context of the expansion of legal lia-
bility for what might loosely be called journalistic or media mal-
practice. Libel falls into this category, as do a variety of other
actions, most of them based on claims of negligence. In such litiga-
tion, the concepts of duty, obligation, fault, reasonableness and so-
5. E.g., "The primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to
serve the general welfare by informing the people and enabling them to make judgments on
the issues of the time." American Society of Newspaper Editors Statement of Principles,
reprinted in RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION, supra note 1, at 289. "The public's
right to know of events of public importance and interest is the overriding mission of the
mass media. . . . Journalists who use their professional status as representatives of the pub-
lic for selfish or other unworthy motives violate a high trust." Society of Professional Jour-
nalists/Sigma Delta Chi Code of Ethics, RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION, supra
note 1, at 291.
6. News Section, Media L. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 26, 1985.
7. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28
HASTINGS L.J. 761, 769 (1977). For similar criticism by a communication scholar, see J. MER-
RILL, THE IMPERATIVE OF FREEDOM 99 (1974).
8. Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment?, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Dec. 4,
1980, at 49, 51-52. For another view skeptical of the value of a "public interest" standard in
determining the level of constitutional protection for the press, see Helle, Judging the Pub-
lic Interest in Libel: The Gertz Decision's Contribution, 61 JOURNALISM Q. 117 (1984).
9. LAMBETH, supra note 1, at 9.
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cial utility often become central. Since these terms have meaning
in the contexts of both ethics and law, confusion may set in. Jus-
tice Holmes has written, "nothing is easier, or, I may say, more
common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral
sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to drop into fal-
lacy."1 In other words, the very vocabulary of rights and duties
may make it easier to convert moral responsibilities into legal re-
sponsibilities. Precisely this possibility troubled Zechariah Chafee
during the debates of the Commission on Freedom of the Press. "I
certainly recognize the moral duty to tell the truth, for example, to
tell the truth about the differences with Spain over Cuba in 1898,"
he argued, "but do you want to make that a legal duty?"1
Nevertheless, although law and morality are not synonymous,
much of the law has strong moral underpinnings. William Ernest
Hocking, the member of the Commission on Freedom of the Press
to whom Chafee was expressing his concern, has written that "law
falls in behind the advance of ethical reflection, attempting to
make unanimous in behavior what ethical sense has made almost
unanimous in motive. . . . Law is the great civilizing agency it is
• . . because it is a working partner with the advancing ethical
sense of the community.' 1 2 Thus, for several reasons-the underly-
ing utilitarian, policy-based rationale of social responsibility the-
ory, the similar vocabulary of law and morals, and the seemingly
easy progression from moral to legal obligation-we might expect
to see pressure exerted to transform professional ethics into legal
standards.
Of course, there is no reason to believe that journalists alone
have faced such pressure. The experience of other professionals
may be instructive. Consequently, this article examines claims of
malpractice against other professionals which raise significant is-
sues regarding the boundary between legal and moral responsibil-
ity. The article then considers cases in which the mass me-
dia-primarily the news media-face similar issues. More
10. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897). See also D. LYONS,
ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 69 (1984); J.H. ALTSCHULL, AGENTS OF POWER: THE ROLE OF
THE NEWS MEDIA IN HUMAN AFFAIRS (1984) [hereinafter ALTSCHULL]. "Responsibility can be
defined either as obligation or duty. It has never been possible to separate legal. . . respon-
sibility from moral duty, and discussions of the ethics of journalism are eternally muddied
by the confusion generated by this semantic puzzle." ALTSCHULL, supra, at 304.
11. Quoted in McIntyre, Repositioning a Landmark: The Hutchins Commission and
Freedom of the Press, 4 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COM. 136, 145 (1987).
12. Hocking, Ways of Thinking About Rights: A New Theory of the Relation Between
Law and Morals, in 2 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 242, 258 (1937).
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specifically, the article focuses on the use of professional standards
and policies as either the source of newly developed legal duties or
as standards against which claims of malpractice and negligence
may be measured. Finally, the article speculates about the implica-
tions for journalists.
I. ETHICAL AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY IN OTHER PROFESSIONS
Actions for malpractice generally fall into the broader category
of negligence actions. An action for negligence requires that the
defendant be found to owe the plaintiff a legal duty to conform to
a particular standard of conduct, and that the defendant has in
fact failed to conform to that standard of conduct.13 In general,
negligence is conduct which "falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm." 4
When defendants are professionals, the standard of conduct re-
quired of them is that they exercise the "skill and knowledge nor-
mally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good
standing .. .'" When defendants are laypersons, the standard is
that they conduct themselves as reasonable persons under like cir-
cumstances. 6 Consequently, when non-professionals are sued, evi-
dence that they conformed to customary standards is admissible
but not conclusive as to negligence; but when professionals are
sued, proof that they conformed to the customary practices of the
profession will generally relieve them of liability."
It follows, then, that testimony by experts can become central in
suits against professionals, since lay jurors presumably are unable
otherwise to judge what is customary practice in a profession.'" It
becomes logical also for plaintiffs to look to other sources of evi-
dence of what constitutes generally accepted professional con-
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See
also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
14. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, at § 282.
15. Id. at § 299A.
16. Id. at § 283.
17. See, e.g., Lambert, Malpractice Liability Concepts Affecting All Professions, in
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE ATL SEMINAR 7 (L. Harolds & M. Block eds. 1966) [hereinafter
Lambert]; and PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960) [hereinafter
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE].
18. Lambert, supra note 17, at 8; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS 985
(1956) [hereinafter HARPER & JAMES]; Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General
Comments, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE, supra note 17, at 1, 5.
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duct-sources that include codes of ethics, professional policy
statements, organizational rules, and even internal evaluations. 9
In fact, developments in other professions indicate that ethical
standards and policies are becoming increasingly relevant in
litigation.
A. Lawyers
The preamble to the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility states that the code does not "under-
take to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for profes-
sional conduct."20 The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
are even more specific:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regu-
lating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a
basis for civil liability .... Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be
deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disci-
plinary consequences of violating such a duty.2
Nevertheless, plaintiffs have attempted to use legal ethics in two
ways in connection with malpractice actions: as a source of legal
duties, the breach of which arguably constitutes malpractice; and
as evidence of the standard of care required of a lawyer, departure
from which is evidence of negligent conduct. The courts have been
reluctant to interpret the code as creating legal duties, but have
been more willing to consider the standards as evidence of what
19. See Lind & Ullberg, Are Professional Codes of Ethics Acquiring the Force of
Law?, 11 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J. 63 (1987). Meanwhile, beyond the context of pro-
fessional malpractice actions, there is a trend in tort litigation toward allowing both discov-
ery and admission at trial of codes, safety standards and policies. The reason is that such
material can provide evidence of the defendant's standard of care. See Annotation, Admissi-
bility in Evidence, on Issue of Negligence, of Codes or Standards of Safety Issued or Spon-
sored By Governmental Body or By Voluntary Association, 58 A.L.R.3d 148 (1974); Com-
ment, Admissibility of Safety Codes, Rules and Standards in Negligence Cases, 37 TENN. L.
REV. 581 (1970). For example, in the context of personal injury suits stemming from indus-
trial accidents, courts have held that voluntary safety codes and policies are admissi-
ble-though not necessarily conclusive-on the issue of negligence. See, e.g., Burley v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 319 So. 2d 334 (La. 1975); Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 258
Iowa 603, 138 N.W.2d 843 (1965); Jorgensen v. Horton, 206 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1973). This
appears to be especially true where the defendant has claimed to have voluntarily adopted
such policies or standards. See Burley, 319 So. 2d at 339.
20. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PREAMBLE (1983).




constitutes "due care" by a lawyer.22
For example, in Carlson v. Morton,23 the Montana Supreme
Court was faced with the issue of whether ethical rules contained
in the Code of Professional Responsibility "create a duty in and of
themselves so that a jury may determine a breach of a legal duty
merely by determining whether the attorney abided by the
rules."24 If so, the plaintiff argued, no expert witness would be re-
quired to demonstrate that the defendant's actions were improper
and negligent.26 Although the court conceded that violation of
some disciplinary rules might establish negligence under some cir-
cumstances, the court flatly rejected the argument that the ethical
rules create legal duties.26 Likewise, the Oregon Supreme Court has
expressed concern that to expose attorneys to law suits for breach
of ethical duties would ultimately deny the public access to the
courts because lawyers would become reluctant to represent
clients."
On the other hand, an Illinois court, finding that legal duties are
embodied in the ABA code, has noted that: "[I]t would be anoma-
lous indeed to hold that professional standards of ethics are not
relevant considerations in a tort action, but are in a disciplinary
proceeding. '28 At least one court has gone so far as to hold that a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is "rebuttable
evidence of malpractice. '29 Another has held that a plaintiff could
22. Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions
Against Attorneys, 9 Oaio N.U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1982); Ross, Violation of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility as Stating Cause of Action in Legal Malpractice, 6 OHIo N.U.L. REV.
692, 694 (1979); Underwood, The Doctor and His Lawyer: Conflicts of Interest, 30 KAN. L.
REV. 385, 388 (1982); Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281, 286 (1979). Most states have
adopted the ABA Model Code.
23. Carlson v. Morton, - Mont. -, 745 P.2d 1133 (1988).
24. Id. at __, 745 P.2d at 1135.
25. Id.
26. Id. at -, 745 P.2d at 1136-37. The court specifically cited the preamble to the
Model Rules in support of its conclusion.
27. Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840, 848 (1981). See also
Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Greening v. Klamen, 652
S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
No. 16,667 (N.M. Nov. 23, 1987) (digested in 3 ABA/BNA Law. Manual Prof. Conduct 399-
400 (Dec. 9, 1987)]; Kahn v. Crames, 92 A.D.2d 634, 459 N.Y.S.2d 941 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
28. Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brummond, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d
1365, 1371 (1979), aff'd, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1979). The supreme court did not
specifically address the code-duty issue. 81 Ill. 2d at 205, 407 N.E.2d at 48-49.
29. Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (1981). See also Han-
sen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
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state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress by alleging violation of the state rules of professional
conduct.3
B. Physicians
Physicians have faced similar developments. It has been held
that since the "warranty of silence" contained in the Hippocratic
Oath "is as much an express warranty as the advertisement of a
commercial entrepreneur,""1 the preservation of a patient's privacy
"is no mere ethical duty upon the part of the doctor; there is a
legal duty as well."3 2 The American Medical Association's Princi-
ples of Medical Ethics have been found to state standards of pro-
fessionalism against which physicians may be held.3 3 And it has
been suggested that physicians' malpractice insurance should in-
demnify them against payment of any judgment "unless the find-
ings of the court show that [the physician] was guilty of conduct
amounting to a violation of the Principles of Medical Ethics.
'3 4
On the other hand, a Texas appeals court has refused to recog-
nize a cause of action against a psychiatrist for breach of implied
warranty of compliance with the "ethical commandments of the
psychiatric calling. ' 35 The lower court had found it critical that the
code of ethics itself contained a statement that the code was "not
law," and the appeals court agreed. 6
30. Kinnamon v. Straitman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 895, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321,
322 (1977).
31. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
32. Id. at 801.
33. C. KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 10-13 (4th ed. 1976). Kramer collects cases on
this issue. See also Schockemoehl, Admissibility of Written Standards as Evidence of the
Standard of Care in Medical and Hospital Negligence Actions in Virginia, 18 U. RICH. L.
REV. 725 (1984). In the context of hospital liability, one commentator has noted that "[niot
one court which accepted the doctrine of independent negligence (by hospitals] rejected the
view that regulations, standards and bylaws were evidence of the standard of care."
Dornette, The Legal Impact of Voluntary Standards in Civil Actions Against the Health
Care Provider, in HOSPITAL LIABILITY: LAW AND TACTIcS 302, 319 (M. Bertolet & L. Gold-
smith, 4th ed. 1980).
34. Hirsh, Insuring Against Medical Professional Liability, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLI-
GENCE, supra note 17, at 138-39. Similarly, in a wrongful death action, a jury has been al-
lowed to conclude that a hospital's failure to observe its own internal policies and proce-
dures indicated negligence. See Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses
and Missionaries v. Perotti, 419 F.2d 704, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
35. Dennis v. T.H. Allison, 678 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 698 S.W.2d 94
(Tex. 1985).
36. 678 S.W.2d at 514. For a discussion of the relationship between psychologists' ethi-




Courts in at least two jurisdictions have found ethics codes to be
relevant in malpractice actions against realtors. In Hoefer v.
Wilckens,37 the Montana Supreme Court accepted the trial court's
findings that several of the broker defendant's acts constituted
malpractice-findings "based largely on the standard of care re-
quired of realtors . . . under the Code of Ethics and Standards of
Practice of the National Association of Realtors. s3  The Iowa Su-
preme Court, reversing a lower court judgment for the defendants,
held that violations of the National Association of Realtors Code of
Ethics constituted evidence of negligence .3  "As a matter of public
policy," the court said, "consideration should be given to evidence
of applicable ethical standards when, as here, they are placed in
evidence and admitted by defendants to be recognized and fol-
lowed in the trade or profession.
'40
D. Accountants
One commentator has noted that the principles of tort liability
for accountants are "consistent with the slightly more specific
statement of professional standards formulated by the American
Institute of Accountants.""' Indeed, several courts have found pro-
fessional ethical standards directly or indirectly relevant in deter-
mining the standard of care to be applied to accountants. 2 At least
one court has leaned heavily on ethical standards as a rationale for
extending the negligence liability of accountants to third parties
the Horns of a Dilemma, 4 J. SCH. PSYCHOLOGY 359 (1975). Bersoff apparently would favor
greater legal responsibility for ethical breaches, and laments that "[a]s long as it appears to
courts and to the public that psychology is a cacophony of competing claims to workable
procedures, the judgment of its members, regardless of the profession's high-minded ethical
standards, will be open to challenge." Id. at 373.
37. 210 Mont. 218, 684 P.2d 468 (1984).
38. Id. at - , 684 P.2d at 472. Although accepting the trial court's findings, the
Montana Supreme Court held that the acts of the broker, which may have constituted mal-
practice, were inappropriate in holding the broker's agent liable for malpractice. Id.
39. See Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985).
40. Id. at 473. But cf. Biggs v. Marsh, 446 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)(violations
of ethics code would not constitute illegal conduct by realtor).
41. Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, in PROFES-
SIONAL NEGLIGENCE, supra note 17, at 262. Hawkins notes-in language that brings to mind
principles of journalistic practice-that it has been recognized that accountants have a legal
duty not merely to verify the arithmetical accuracy of balance sheets, but to inquire into
their substantial accuracy. Id. at 263.
42. See, e.g., Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 380-81 (Mo.




not under contract with them-a major change in the law.43 In lan-
guage strongly reminiscent of discussions of social responsibility in
journalism, the court cited directly to the Code of Ethics of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
The ethical Code of the American Institute emphasizes the profession's re-
sponsibility to the public, a responsibility that has grown as the number of
investors has grown, as the relationship between corporate managers and
stockholders has become more impersonal, and as government increasingly
relies on accounting information.
4
"The Accountant today occupies a position of public trust,"" the
court concluded.
Perhaps ironically, such expanded legal liability has led the
American Institute to make it clear that accountants have a re-
sponsibility to look actively for financial fraud inside companies
and not simply to detect fraud if it comes their way. 6 The new
rules also will require accountants to state whether they have any
doubts about whether the company they are auditing will survive
for another year.' 7 News reports announcing the new rules noted a
potential "chilling effect" on some accountants-many may decide
to get out of the auditing business rather than risk suits by
shareholders.'8
E. Clergy
During the past several years, members of the clergy have begun
to find themselves vulnerable to malpractice actions.' 9 Such cases
43. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986). In so doing, the court concluded that the widely accepted
rule of Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), holding that accountants
have no duty to parties not in privity, could no longer be justified. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820,
223 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
44. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226. Auditors have been characterized as "besieged by
lawsuits charging either negligence or fraud." Labaton, New Liability for Auditors, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 5, 1987, at 26, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
46. New Auditor Rule to Require Search for Client Fraud, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1988,
at 1, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. This development has been heavily documented in the legal literature. See, e.g.,
Note, Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Intentional
Torts, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 419 (1988); Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at
Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 47 (1981) [hereinafter Bergman]; Comment,
Church Tort Liability in Spite of First Amendment Protection, 12 S.U.L. REv. 37 (1985);
Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 163
(1981); Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: the First
1989 245
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are particularly germane here because ministerial malpractice, like
journalistic malpractice, directly implicates first amendment
interests.
The leading case is Nally v. Grace Community Church of the
Valley,"° which the California Court of Appeals twice decided in
favor of the plaintiffs"' before the California Supreme Court re-
versed late in 1988.52 In Nally, the parents of a suicide victim sued
ministers and their church for wrongful death, alleging in part that
the suicide occurred because a pastor negligently discouraged the
victim from receiving psychological help, and that the victim com-
mitted suicide because he did not receive such essential treat-
ment.63 After a three-week trial, the trial judge granted the defend-
ants' motion for non-suit; the court of appeals reversed. 4 The
appeals court found that non-therapist counselors-including min-
isters-have a legal duty to take appropriate precautions where an
emotionally disturbed person exhibits suicidal tendencies."6
The minimal standard of care, the appeals court held, requires
taking steps to place such a counselee "in the hands of those to
whom society has given the authority and who by education and
experience are in the best position to prevent the suicidal individ-
ual from succeeding in killing himself. '' "5 Of particular relevance is
the fact that the court apparently based this standard of care in
part on the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses-experts
Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1986); Comment, Made Out of Whole
Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 507
(1983); and Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing
in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1985).
50. 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984).
51. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 303 (1984) [hereinafter Nally I]; and Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,
194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987) [hereinafter Nally II]. The California Su-
preme Court deleted Nally I from publication in the official reports.
52. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, No. S002882 (Cal. Nov. 23, 1988)
(LEXIS 256, States library, Cal. file) [hereinafter 1988 Cal. LEXIS 256]. See also Justices
Dismiss Suit Over Clergy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
53. Nally I, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 304, 305. The plaintiffs also alleged that the pastors
committed intentional infliction of emotional distress by exacerbating the victim's pre-ex-
isting feelings of guilt, anxiety and depression, knowing that he had suicidal tendencies and
knowing that this conduct would increase the likelihood that he would commit suicide. And
they alleged that the defendants negligently failed to require adequate training for their
counselors. In Nally I, the appeals court reversed summary judgment for the defendants on
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, but did not consider the other causes
of action. Id. at 309.
54. Nally II, 194 Cal. App. 3d at __, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 222, 243.
55. Id. at , 240 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
56. Id. at -, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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with both psychological and clerical credentials." Plaintiffs' coun-
sel also wanted to introduce into evidence the standards of the
American Association of Pastoral Counselors, but the trial court
refused to allow this evidence because neither the church nor its
pastors were Association members. 8 The trial court also excluded
from evidence a tape recording made by one of the pastors to ad-
vise prospective church counselors on suicide. Made after Nally's
death, the recording seemingly treated suicide with approval. The
state supreme court upheld the trial court on the inadmissibility of
the recording.59 The question of the admissibility of the Associa-
tion standards apparently was not appealed.
The defendants argued that the malpractice action was barred
by the freedom of religion clause of the first amendment. The ap-
peals court responded that the evidence failed to establish that the
Grace Community Church or its counselors held any religious be-
lief which would preclude them from referring suicidal counselees
to qualified counselors.6 0 The state supreme court never reached
the constitutional issue. Instead, it found that the defendants owed
no legal duty to the plaintiff because there was no special relation-
ship between the parties, there was little causal connection be-
tween the counseling and the suicide, and imposing such a duty
could have a serious deleterious effect on the availability of coun-
seling services.6'
Two justices concurred, concluding that the defendants owed the
plaintiff a legal duty but did not breach it.2 As evidence of the
requisite "special relationship" between the plaintiff and defend-
ant, they pointed to a church-published "Guide for Spiritual Coun-
selors" which proclaimed the defendants to be proficient at treat-
ing severe depression and suicidal tendencies." They specifically
rejected the argument that the first amendment precluded recogni-
tion of any legal duty, finding the duty in question to be religiously
57. Id. at -, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 221, 227.
58. 1988 Cal. LEXIS 256 at 15. See also Barker, Clergy Negligence: Are Juries Ready
to Sit in Judgment?, TRIAL, July 1986, at 56, 59. Nine of 10 jurors and alternates inter-
viewed after the trial said they were leaning strongly in favor of damages for the family;
only one favored the church's position. See Girdner, To Err is Human, CALIF. LAW., Aug.
1985, at 21.
59. 1988 Cal. LEXIS 256 at 47-50. The court of appeals had overruled the trial judge
on the question of admissibility of the tape recording. Nally 11, 194 Cal. App. 3d at -, 240
Cal. Rptr. at 237-41.
60. Nally 11, 194 Cal. App. 3d at -, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
61. 1988 Cal. LEXIS 256 at 31-40.
62. Id. at 51-52.
63. Id. at 54-55.
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neutral and the government's interest to be compelling. 4
In two other reported cases, courts have affirmed dismissals of
clergy malpractice actions. In Hester v. Barnett,"5 the Missouri
Court of Appeals directly addressed the plaintiff's assertion that
the defendant minister acted "contrary to ministerial ethics and
against Missouri law . . . and against the standard of conduct im-
posed upon ministers of the gospel .. ."66 "The tradition that a
spiritual advisor does not divulge communications received in that
capacity . . . , even if a tenet of 'ministerial ethics' as Count I
pleads, describes a moral, not a legal duty,"6 the court concluded.
"In the absence of a legal duty, a breach of a moral duty does not
suffice to invest tort liability."68 In Handley v. Richards, 9 the Ala-
bama Supreme Court adopted this reasoning as its own."
The Ohio Court of Appeals has also rejected a clergy malpractice
claim, but the two judges voting to uphold dismissal of the claim
disagreed among themselves. 71 One rejected first amendment argu-
ments against malpractice, but found, without elaborating, that the
facts in the case at bar could not support such an action. For the
other judge, first amendment concerns were dispositive.
There are no published or generally accepted standards for such counseling.
Thus, the appropriate standard for pastoral counselors would have to be set
at a reasonable minister standard. . . . Such an inquiry, however, leads to a
review of the training and education of the particular religious body to
which the minister is attached. This area of inquiry is . . . forbidden be-
cause of the First Amendment.
72
The third judge favored the plaintiff, arguing that the alleged sex-
ual conduct was not "even arguably religious," and as such, "is un-
64. Id. at 63, 66.
65. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
66. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the minister invited their trust and promised confi-
dentiality, but then revealed family problems to the entire congregation, accused the plain-
tiffs publicly of child abuse, and attempted to get the children removed from the home. Id.
at 550.
67. Id. at 544.
68. Id.
69. 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
70. Id. at 684. The administrator of plaintiff's estate alleged that the plaintiff commit-
ted suicide in part because of emotional trauma suffered when he discovered that the minis-
ter who was providing marital counseling to him and his spouse allegedly was having a sex-
ual affair with the spouse. Id. at 683.
71. Strock v. Presnell, No. 9673986 (Ohio Ct. App. July 15, 1987) (LEXIS States li-
brary, Ohio file). Plaintiff alleged that minister was having sexual affair with plaintiff's
spouse while giving the couple marital counseling.
72. Id.
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protected activity analogous to unprotected speech."' "7 Further,
again in language reminiscent of the debate over journalistic re-
sponsibility, the judge asserted that:
[Flar from impeding religious liberty, allowing malpractice claims against
prurient pastoral counselors reinforces the church's own religious doctrine.
... Imposing societal prohibitions of such conduct on a minister through
civil law does not restrict religious liberty, but actually enhances it.74
Nor is this view of clergy liability held only by those outside of
the clergy. One rabbi and law professor has argued that members
of the clergy should be legally responsible for failure to refer to an
expert those counseling cases beyond their expertise. The duty to
refer in such cases "is an ethical duty and the imposition of [legal]
liability, far from denigrating the position and efficaciousness of
the clergyman, would enhance it."
'75
Other professions, too, have had their ethical standards haunt
them in court. 6 The point is simply that the boundary between
law and ethics-between legal and moral duty-has become
muddy in a variety of contexts in a variety of professions. We
should not be surprised to see a similar development in the context
of mass communication.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY/SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Closely related to questions of duty and standard of care is the
role of expert testimony. Either the plaintiff or defendant may at-
tempt to use expert testimony to establish what constitutes due
care in the context of a given case.7 But expert testimony will be
admissible only where the question is one that lay jurors cannot
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Bergman, supra note 49, at 66. Like journalists, of course, members of the clergy
have first amendment protection. Bergman notes that despite this, and despite the fact that
members of the clergy have been exempt from regulation and licensing (as have journalists),
malpractice liability may still be imposed. He argues that the counseling function can be
conceptually separated from the clergy's purely religious function so as to make malpractice
actions for harmful counseling possible without creating first amendment problems. Id. at
59, 66.
76. See, e.g., Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa
1975) (Rules of Fair Practice of National Association of Security Dealers are appropriate
indicia of standard of conduct required of stock broker); Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140,
474 N.E.2d 13 (1985) (in malpractice action against social worker, provisions of state law
along with code of ethics adopted by National Association of Social Workers make clear that
certain minimum standards of professional conduct exist for social workers).
77. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, at 985; Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in
the Trial of Negligence Issues, 26 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1947).
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resolve within their own competence.78 Codes and safety standards
may be admissible where the court finds them relevant and not
within the category of inadmissible hearsay. And expert testimony
can help solve the hearsay problem-a reluctance to allow evidence
that is not subject to cross-examination-by providing a witness
subject to cross-examination. The expert may also then refer to in-
dustry codes and standards, thus gaining their admissibility.
79
Even in the absence of specific codes and policies, the "custom"
of a defendant's occupation may be relevant. Custom refers to
whether a defendant has behaved in a given situation in the same
way as those in his occupation generally behave.80 Such evidence
may be helpful to a defendant who has behaved customarily, but
customary behavior may nevertheless itself be negligent if, for ex-
ample, it is clearly dangerous or careless." In any case, when a de-
fendant offers evidence of custom-or offers codes, policies or
other standards as evidence-there is always the risk such evi-
dence will backfire if a jury believes that the defendant has de-
parted from such standards.2
Occasionally, the defendant in a tort action will have engaged in
some sort of self-analysis of whatever incident led to the legal suit.
Since such "self-critical evaluation" could generate damning infor-
mation, it would seem reasonable to expect a plaintiff to seek ac-
cess to it." Precisely this situation has led to claims from defend-
ants for a "self-critical evaluation privilege" from discovery. 4
Privilege seemingly would be consistent with the long-standing
principle that evidence of taking precautions after an accident
should be excluded because it reflects hindsight, not foresight, and
that admitting such evidence would counterproductively discour-
78. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, at 985.
79. Comment, supra note 19, at 585; Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Prac-
tices in Tort Litigation, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1965).
80. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 185-96; HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 18, at 977.
81. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 194-95. See also Morris, Custom and
Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1942).
82. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 195-96.
83. See, e.g., Ames, Modern Techniques in the Preparation and Trial of a Medical
Malpractice Suit, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE, supra note 17, at 113.
84. See, e.g., Case Comment, Civil Procedure: Self-Evaluative Reports-A Qualified
Privilege in Discovery? 57 MINN. L. REV. 807 (1973); Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1983); Spencer, The Hospital Incident Report: Asset or
Liability?, 22 A.F.L. REV. 148 (1980-81). But see Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for
Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551 (1983) [hereinafter Flanagan].
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age people from taking precautions. 5
Some courts have granted such a privilege, but others have re-
jected it. In Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Incorporated,86 for exam-
ple, a federal district court denied a motion to compel discovery of
the minutes and reports of the defendant hospital's staff meetings
concerning the death of plaintiff's husband. The court found an
"overwhelming public interest" in encouraging the flow of ideas
and advice: "Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an
atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be
used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice
suit. '8 7 On the other hand, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to
prohibit discovery of the records of a hospital peer review commit-
tee that studied the treatment that led to a malpractice suit. "We
find no expression of policy in either the general law of evidence or
in the statutes according any protection of confidentiality in the
situation presented here on public policy grounds."8 8 Even where
the privilege is granted, however, it appears that it covers evalua-
tive statements and suggestions for future conduct, but not actual
facts uncovered by an investigation.89
To one degree or another, ethical codes, policies and standards,
plus self-critical evaluation all reflect concern about professional
responsibility and a preference for self-regulation over legal sanc-
tion.90 Yet it appears clear, at least in the context of other occupa-
tions and professions, that these very efforts may enhance the legal
vulnerability they seek to avoid. We can now turn to mass commu-
nication and consider whether the same risks are present in that
field.
85. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, at 981-82.
86. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. 50 F.R.D. at 250-51. See also Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). See generally Holbrook & Dunn, The Discoverability and Use of Hospitals' Quality
Assurance Committee Records, in HOSPITAL LIABILITY, supra note 33, at 269.
88. State ex rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. 1984). See also Wright
v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
89. See, e.g., Gillman, 53 F.R.D. at 318-19. "Thus, as recognized by the courts, the
qualified privilege for self-critical studies protects only subjective conclusions. Flana-
gan, supra note 84, at 558.
90. Of course, lawyers and physicians are licensed by the state. But the preamble to
the ABA's Model Rules, for example, asserts that "[t]o the extent that lawyers meet the
obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated.
Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government
domination." MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Preamble.
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III. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND JOURNALISTIC "MALPRACTICE"
Journalistic ethics and policies have played 'a role both in at-
tempts to establish legal duties and to provide standards against
which legal fault can be measured. In actions for libel and invasion
of privacy, courts and litigants implicitly accept the premise that
there is a legal duty not to libel people or invade their privacy. In
actions based on other theories of liability, however, duty can be-
come a central issue. In the context of fault, particularly in libel
cases, journalists themselves have argued that ethical norms and
customs should provide standards helpful in determining whether
a journalist has exercised "due care."
A. Duty
The Statement of Principles of the American Society of Newspa-
per Editors declares that "[elvery effort must be made to assure
that the news content is accurate, free from bias and in context,
and that all sides are presented fairly.""' It further states that
"[j]ournalists should respect the rights of people involved in the
news, observe the common standards of decency and stand ac-
countable to the public for the fairness and accuracy of their news
reports."92 Similarly, the code of the Society of Professional Jour-
nalists declares that journalists are obligated to "perform with in-
telligence, objectivity, accuracy, and fairness. ' Despite the vague-
ness of such language, a number of litigants have premised their
legal claims on alleged breaches of just such duties, although the
codes have not been directly cited.
Outside of the context of libel and privacy, several plaintiffs
have built their claims on the basic argument that journalists have
a legal duty to be accurate and to verify information before pub-
lishing. For example, in Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record,
Incorporated,94 the plaintiff asserted that a newspaper had negli-
gently breached a legal duty of accuracy when it wrongly reported
the result of a court decision. The plaintiff was not directly in-
volved in the inaccurately reported case; instead, he claimed to
have suffered severe mental distress because the inaccurate report
91. American Society of Newspaper Editors Code, Art. IV, reprinted in RESPONSIBIL-
ITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION, supra note 1, at 290.
92. Id. at Art. VI.
93. Code of Ethics, Society of Professional Journalists/Sigma Delta Chi, reprinted in
RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION, supra note 1, at 291.
94. 454 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J. 1978).
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led him to believe that criminal charges against him would have to
be dismissed, and that he became despondent and depressed when
he learned the truth 5 The court rejected his argument:
Accuracy in news reporting is certainly a desideratum, but the chilling effect
of imposing a high duty of care on those in the business of news dissemina-
tion and making that duty run to a wide range of readers or TV viewers
would have a chilling effect which is unacceptable under our Constitution.9
Courts have consistently rejected claims based on inaccurate fi-
nancial reporting that has allegedly caused plaintiffs' financial loss.
The leading case appears to have been Jaillet v. Cashman,97 a suit
claiming that plaintiff lost money because he based a transaction
on an erroneous Dow-Jones ticker report regarding the tax impact
of a Supreme Court decision. In sustaining a demurrer, the court
found the defendant to have the same obligations and duties as a
newspaper publisher, and concluded that:
There is a moral obligation upon every one to say nothing that is not true,
but the law does not attempt to impose liability for a violation of that duty
unless it constitutes a breach of contract obligation or trust, or amounts to a
deceit, libel, or slander. Theoretically, a different rule might be logically
adopted, but as matter of practical expediency, such a doctrine seems abso-
lutely necessary. 8
Subsequent decisions have elaborated on this conclusion, reasoning
that perfection is unattainable in the publishing business, and that
the possibility of virtually unlimited liability would deter dissemi-
nation of printed material.9 The first amendment itself has been
recognized as a defense. 100
95. Id. at 1157.
96. Id. at 1160. See also Curry v. Evening Journal Publishing Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68
P.2d 168 (1937) (newspaper has no duty of accuracy to third parties in publication of obitu-
ary); Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963) (no action lies
against newspaper for nonlibellous but inaccurate reporting).
97. 115 Misc. 383, 189 N.Y.S. 743, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd, 202 A.D. 805, 194
N.Y.S. 947 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923).
98. 115 Misc. at 384, 189 N.Y.S. at 744.
99. First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing action by plaintiffs alleging financial loss due to erroneous
description of corporate bonds). See also Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 137 Misc. 2d 94, 520
N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987)(newspaper not liable where plaintiff allegedly lost money
because news story did not distinguish Canadian from U.S. dollars); Gale v. Value Line, 640
F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1986) (publisher not liable for financial loss allegedly suffered by plain-
tiff because of incomplete information provided on securities); Gutter v. Dow Jones, 22 Ohio
St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986) (newspaper not liable for financial loss allegedly suffered
by plaintiff because of report erroneously stating that bonds were trading with interest).
100. See Daniel, 137 Misc. 2d at 100-02, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40; First Equity Corp. of
Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Gutter, 22 Ohio St.
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Although ethics codes and policy statements have not directly
been cited in such cases, at least two courts have suggested that a
duty of accuracy will not be recognized even if the media claim to
be accurate and encourage readers to rely on the information they
disseminate. Plaintiffs in one case argued that the defendant effec-
tively warranted the reliability of its content because it touted the
reliability of its publication and marketed it as providing "action-
worthy" information. "This suggestion is meritless," the court re-
sponded. "It is one thing to say that the defendant extols the vir-
tues of its publication. It is quite another to say that it anywhere
assumes responsibility for 100 percent accuracy."'°
2d at 289-91 490 N.E.2d at 901-02; Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990,
993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
101. First Equity Corp. of Fla., 670 F. Supp. at 118. See also Demuth, 432 F. Supp. at
990. In Demuth, plaintiff claimed to have lost $4 million in business because an entry in a
Merck reference manual misstated the toxicity of a substance used by plaintiff's product.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Merck assumed a duty of accuracy because
it published its index for a serious purpose and expected readers to rely on it as an authori-
tative source of accurate information. Id. at 993. Similarly, in Roman v. City of New York,
110 Misc. 2d 799, 442 N.Y.S.2d 945 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981), summary judgment was granted to
Planned Parenthood in a suit claiming that plaintiff conceived an unwanted child because
she followed allegedly inaccurate information in a Planned Parenthood booklet. Citing De-
muth, the court concluded that Planned Parenthood owed no duty to the plaintiff even
though it may pointedly have intended the booklet to provide information to the general
public and could have reasonably foreseen plaintiff's reliance on it: "One who publishes a
text cannot be said to assume liability for all 'misstatements', said or unsaid, to a potentially
unlimited public for a potentially unlimited period." 110 Misc. 2d at 802, 442 N.Y.S.2d at
948.
In two non-media cases, judges have remarked on the possible liability of the media for
the harm resulting from incorrect weather forecasting. In National Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954), the court affirmed judg-
ment for the government where plaintiff alleged that his property suffered flood damage
because an inaccurate weather forecast led him not to take precautions. A concurring opin-
ion, focusing specifically on the duty question, worried about the bar's attempts to "get the
camel's nose into the tent" in the area of liability for gathering or disseminating public
information. 210 F.2d at 280 (Johnsen, J., concurring). The same judge asserted that "no
liability would have existed against a newspaper or a radio station for any inaccuracy, negli-
gent or otherwise, in whatever public information it might, on its own accord and by its own
means, have undertaken to gather and disseminate about the flood conditions of the Kansas
River .... " Id. at 279.
On the other hand, in Connelly v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1970), the
court reversed a demurrer in a negligence suit brought against the state for allegedly negli-
gent dissemination of inaccurate river height forecasts. A marina owner alleged that he suf-
fered damage because, in reliance on the forecasts, he set his docks too low. The court found
that the state might not have owed plaintiff a duty but for the fact that he had personally
called the forecasting office and identified himself as a businessman with much at stake in
the proper river height forecast. Id. at 748, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60. In dissent, Judge David
worried that such reasoning might appear to create duty if a person called a television sta-
tion and asked for a weather report, then acted on it and suffered harm. Id. at 758, 84 Cal.
Rptr. at 267. See also Brown v. United States, 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
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Nevertheless, in one case-albeit involving a management con-
sulting firm-a duty of accuracy has been recognized over the first
amendment-based objections of the defendant. In South Carolina
Ports Authority v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton,'0 2 a state government
agency sued a firm that had prepared a report, commissioned by
the Georgia Ports Authority, comparing ports in Savannah, Ga.,
and Charleston, S.C. The plaintiff alleged that the firm had negli-
gently prepared a report containing false and misleading informa-
tion that harmed business in the South Carolina port; a central
question was whether the consultant owed any duty to the plain-
tiff. The answer, provided by the South Carolina Supreme Court,
was "yes":
We hold a duty to use due care, running from a consultant to the commer-
cial competitor who is being critiqued, arises when the consultant under-
takes to objectively analyze and compare the attributes of commercial com-
petitors for the purpose of giving one a market advantage over the other.
Under this analysis, [the consultant] owed a duty to the S.C. State Ports
Authority to exercise due care to accurately report objective factual data
concerning the Charleston port, if it knew or should have known the report
was intended to be used by [the Georgia Ports Authority] as a marketing
device.
103
The trial court then rejected the consultant's argument that the
first amendment required summary judgment. The court con-
cluded that the consultant's report was a form of "fact-based"
commercial speech entitled to diminished first amendment protec-
tion which would be adequately provided by the proof require-
ments of negligence law. 04
With this sole exception-perhaps distinguishable on grounds
that it involved a consultant and not a mass communicator-it ap-
pears that, at least outside the sphere of libel, courts have consist-
ently rejected efforts to "legalize" mass communicators' voluntary
assumption of an obligation to be accurate. The same can be said
regarding any voluntarily assumed obligation to correct inaccuracy.
U.S. 1058 (1987) (no duty existed on part of Weather Service where plaintiffs claimed that
negligent forecasting caused death of fishermen).
102. 676 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1987).
103. 289 S.C. 373, 376-77, 346 S.E.2d 324, 325-26 (1986). The question of the existence
of duty had been certified to the state supreme court by the federal court of appeals for the
D.C. Circuit.
104. 676 F. Supp. at 349-50. The court appeared to believe that the "burdens of proof
and presumptions operative in negligence compared to defamation cases" would actually
favor the defendant. But the court may have misunderstood the constitutional law of libel.
Id.
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In at least two cases, courts have rejected theories of liability based
on alleged violation of a duty to retract, even when allegedly
libelous material was involved.105
The courts have also consistently rejected creative claims that
the media have a "duty to publish" various types of material in
order to meet their obligation to keep the public fully informed
and their obligation to be fair. For example, when the New York
Times failed to include one of his novels in its best sellers list,
author William Peter Blatty sued the newspaper, alleging in part
that the Times had breached a public duty and trust to report the
news fairly and accurately. 106 Blatty claimed that wrongfully fail-
ing to include his novel in the list cost him potential profits from
the sale of paperback and film rights. The California Supreme
Court ultimately avoided the duty question, and dismissed the
case on grounds that the omission was not sufficiently "of and con-
cerning" Blatty to withstand first amendment scrutiny.10 7 How-
ever, other courts have directly addressed such claims of duty and
have rejected them.'08 Nor is this surprising, given the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Miami Herald v. Tornillo09
that the first amendment was violated by a state law requiring
newspapers to provide reply space to political candidates they
105. Beasley v. Hearst Corp., 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2067 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1985); Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1632 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
106. Blatty v. New York Times, 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1038, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542, 544, 728
P.2d 1177, 1179 (1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1107 (1988).
107. 42 Cal. 3d at 1048, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 552, 728 P.2d at 1187.
108. See, e.g., Newman v. New York Post, 13 Media L. Rep (BNA) 1059 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1986), aff'd, 133 A.D.2d 585, 519 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1987) (rejecting claim that newspapers
breached duty to cover candidates for city-wide office as result of which candidates lost
potential contributions); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (refusing to issue
injunction requiring media to publicize certain foreign policy issues); Cyntje v. Daily News
Pub. Co., 551 F. Supp. 403 (D.V.I. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 846 (1984) (granting sum-
mary judgment to media where plaintiff sought damages for failure to run news releases);
Nichols v. Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1543 (N.D. Tex. 1987)(dis-
missing suit by plaintiff seeking to have certain stories published); Indiana Constr. Corp. v.
Chicago Tribune, 648 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (granting summary judgment to news-
paper where claim is that newspaper breached duty to publish and duty not to lose adver-
tisement). But cf. Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d
401 (Ct. App. 1946) (reinstating action for prima facie tort where plaintiff alleges that de-
fendant's radio program omits or improperly ranks plaintiff's songs, thus causing loss of
business).
109. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). "A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but
press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it can-
not be legislated." 'Id. at 256. In the context of broadcasting, however, the Court has taken
essentially the opposite position. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
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criticized.
Plaintiffs have had more, though limited, success in alleging that
the media have a legal duty to investigate the accuracy of non-
libelous information. Most of these cases have involved a "duty to
investigate" claims made in advertisements. Most commonly,
courts have refused to recognize such a duty because of fear that
requiring the media to investigate the accuracy of information in
advertising would create an onerous burden that would discourage
the media from accepting advertising and drive many publications
out of business." e Cases in which a duty to investigate advertising
has been recognized appear to fall into three categories: sexually
explicit advertisements, 1 ' advertisements in which the publisher
itself appears to recommend the product," 2 and advertisements
apparently soliciting serious criminal conduct."'
The "criminal conduct" cases both involve advertisements
placed in Soldier of Fortune magazine and involve allegations that
the magazine negligently published what were in fact advertise-
ments placed by "hit men" who either harmed or murdered plain-
110. See, e.g., Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch Corp., 129 Misc. 2d 477, 493 N.Y.S.2d 414
(1985) (no duty to verify authenticity of classified ad that led to obscene phone calls); Wal-
ters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1987) (no duty to
investigate safety of tampon advertised in magazine); Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207,
322 A.2d 824 (1974) (no duty to investigate or test fireworks advertised in magazine). See
also Goldstein v. Garlick, 65 Misc. 2d 538, 318 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1971) (no duty to determine
possible impact of ad on advertiser's competitors); Hernandez v. Underwood, 7 Media L.
Rep. 1535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)(no duty to investigate possible medical risks in hair implan-
tation process advertised in newspaper); Pittman v. Dow Jones, 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La.),
aff'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987) (no duty to investigate veracity of ad for "jumbo interest
rates"); Pressler v. Dow Jones, 88 A.D.2d 928, 450 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1982) (no duty to investi-
gate advertising claims for product); Tatta v. News Group Publications, 12 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (no duty to verify phone number in ad with sexual
overtones).
111. Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d
853 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971), appeal dismissed, 71 Misc. 2d 986, 337 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1972)
(newspaper had duty to verify telephone number in sexually explicit advertisement); Ves-
covo v. New Way Enters., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976) (newspaper has duty
to verify authenticity of sexually explicit advertisement).
112. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969). In
Hanberry, plaintiff sued the publisher of Good Housekeeping after she allegedly fell and
sustained serious injuries while using shoes given Good Housekeeping's consumer guarantee
seal. Reversing a demurrer sustained by the trial court, the appeals court held that Hearst
owed the plaintiff a legal duty to use ordinary care so that consumers are not unreasonably
exposed to risk. The court concluded that where Hearst's procedures and methods repre-
sented to the public that it possessed superior knowledge and special information regarding
the product, it is liable for negligent representations of either fact or opinion. Id. at 686, 81
Cal. Rptr. at 523.
113. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark.
1987); Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
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tiffs or their relatives. Two federal district courts denied summary
judgment to the magazine in these cases.' 1 4 The magazine subse-
quently settled one of the cases, 1 5 and a jury brought in a plain-
tiff's verdict of $9.4 million in the other." 6 In the latter case, the
surviving family of a murder victim alleged that the magazine was
negligent in failing to investigate the nature of an ad placed by the
murderer and saying: "EX-MARINES-67-69 'Nam Vets-Ex-
DI-weapons specialist-jungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk as-
signments U.S. or overseas [followed by a telephone number]. 1" 7
The court rejected the magazine's argument that it was under no
legal duty to the plaintiffs." 8 Two factors appeared to be central to
the court's reasoning: the fact that commercial speech was in-
volved, and the fact that the Supreme Court seems to have ap-
proved of negligence actions even in the context of some non-com-
mercial speech. 119 However, the court did note that the standard of
reasonable care might be different for a newspaper of general cir-
culation even if the same ad were involved: "The reasonableness of
its publication in defendants' magazine without investigation, how-
ever, is not clear given the nature of the magazine and its reader-
ship and given the fact that many advertisements submitted for





In non-advertising contexts, the courts have been far more reluc-
tant to find a duty to investigate non-libelous information. Courts
have rejected claims that newspapers have a legal duty to investi-
gate the accuracy of information in obituaries before publishing
them, '2 or to investigate the safety of a dandruff remedy recom-
mended in a feature story.'22 Likewise, a federal district court re-
114. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987); 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
115. The Norwood case was settled. Damages Given for 'Hired Gun' Ad, THE NEws
MEDIA & THE LAW, Spring 1988, at 50, 51 [hereinafter Damages Given].
116. Magazine Is Ordered to Pay $9.4 Million for Killer's Ad, N.Y. Times, March 4,
1988, at 9, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). A $110 million suit has now been filed against the magazine by
another plaintiff claiming that his father's murder was arranged through a similar ad in the
magazine. Damages Given, supra note 115, at 51.
117. Eimann, 680 F. Supp. at 864.
118. Id. at 866.
119. Id. at 865-66. The court referred to the libel case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), holding that states may permit private figures to win libel suits upon
proof of negligence. Id.
120. Eimann, 680 F. Supp. at 866.
121. See, e.g., Rubinstein v. New York Post, 128 Misc. 2d 1, 488 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1985);
Wolford v. Herald-Mail, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1426 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1984).




fused to recognize that the publisher of the Physicians Desk Refer-
ence had any legal duty to independently test the drugs it
included. 23 The plaintiff claimed that the gross negligence of the
defendant in publishing information about Valium led to her ad-
diction to the drug. Although it was unclear whether the informa-
tion was or was not commercial advertising, the court found the
distinction unimportant. If it were advertising matter, the pub-
lisher still had not warranted or recommended the drug; if it were
non-commercial speech, it was protected by the first amendment
as speech important to the public interest.124
Only in one case has a court apparently recognized a legal "duty
to investigate" outside of the context of libel. In Parnell v. Booth
Newspapers, Incorporated,1 25 a federal court denied a newspaper's
motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff alleged negli-
gence resulting in emotional distress. The plaintiff claimed that
the newspaper had published retouched, but still identifiable, pho-
tographs of her in connection with articles on prostitution. In so
doing, she alleged, the newspaper had failed to exercise reasonable
care in investigating and verifying, and in failing "to follow gener-
ally acceptable journalistic standards" in breach of legal duty.12
In a variety of other contexts, however, courts do appear to have
recognized legal duties rooted in the media's heretofore voluntarily
123. Libertelli v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1734 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
124. Id. at 1735-36. Even in cases where plaintiffs have claimed to have been injured
while following instructions in various "how-to" books, courts have generally refused to rec-
ognize any legal duty on the part of publishers. See, e.g., Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold
Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 716, 480 N.E.2d 1263 (1985) (publisher of book on tool making had no
duty to provide adequate and safe instructions and warnings); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F.
Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987)(publisher of book on metalsmithing had no duty to warn read-
ers of content of books it publishes). In only one case has liability been imposed on a pub-
lisher for injuries suffered by a person following allegedly misleading instructions in a
book-in this case instructions on an eighth grade chemistry experiment. See Rand Mc-
Nally to Pay Damages in School Textbook Mishap, PUBLISHER'S W.EKLY, Sept. 26, 1980, at
42. But see Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc. 2d 189, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1981), modified, 88 A.D.2d
787, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1982), appeal dismissed, 88 A.D.2d 790 (1982)(publisher under no
duty to warn of possible danger in procedures suggested in fourth grade science text).
Courts have, however, left open the question of an author's liability to readers. See, e.g.,
Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. App. 1977) (book retailer not liable for consequences
of information contained in book, but liability of author remains open question). One suit
has been brought directly against an author for injuries allegedly sustained by an infant
because of vitamins administered upon advice offered in the author's book. However, it was
dismissed on a jurisdictional issue. See Young v. Mallet, 49 A.D.2d 528, 371 N.Y.S.2d 1
(Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
125. 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
126. Id. at 916.
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assumed standards. In Hyde v. City of Columbia,2 the Missouri
Court of Appeals held that a crime victim, who was harassed by
her assailant after she was identified by a newspaper, did have a
cause of action for negligence. The plaintiff had argued that the
newspaper's duty not to identify her while her assailant remained
at large flowed in part from the paper's own internal policy.128 The
court apparently, though ambiguously, accepted this argument:
"[Tihe 'unwritten policy' not to print the name and address of a
female victim of a reported male attempted or actual sexual as-
sault is nothing more than a usual news medium practice in con-
formance with precepts of 'common decency' and the discerned
'mores of the community'.' 29
A newspaper's policy statements also became legally significant
in United States v. Winans,1 0 a securities fraud case central to
which was a journalist's violation of his newspaper's policy forbid-
ding advance disclosure of stories the paper plans to publish. Al-
though not a tort action, the case is relevant because it focused on
the issue of whether the paper's written internal policy could give
rise to a legal duty, the breach of which could become the basis of
criminal liability.
The case resulted from the discovery that a Wall Street Journal
reporter who wrote an influential column on stock market gossip
had become part of a scheme in which he would leak the contents.
of upcoming stories to outsiders who could then profit from
whatever impact the stories had on the market. The government
charged the reporter with violation of portions of the Securities
Exchange Act and with mail and wire fraud, using the rationale
that by violating the newspaper's confidentiality policy he had per-
petrated a fraud on the Journal which hurt its reputation and in-
tegrity. The court of appeals held that the Securities Exchange Act
could be used to:
[PIroscribe an employee's unlawful misappropriation from his employer, a
financial newspaper, of material nonpublic information in the form of the
newspaper's forthcoming publication schedule, in connection with a scheme
to purchase and sell securities to be analyzed or otherwise discussed in fu-
ture columns in the newspaper.' 2 '
127. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
128. Id. at 256.
129. Id. at 269 n.25.
130. 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S.
Ct. 316 (1987).
131. 791 F.2d at 1026.
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The court specifically rejected the argument that this determina-
tion violates the first amendment. Ironically, it was precisely be-
cause the policy was not imposed by the government that the court
saw no constitutional problem.' If criminal liability can be predi-
cated on breach of duties established by a newspaper's internal
policies, it would seem reasonable to argue that civil liability might
be similarly premised. 13 One commentator has subsequently wor-
ried that the case "can be interpreted as giving the SEC a brief to
oversee the ethics of financial journalism of the responsible news
media" and could "generate wide ranging inquiries into ethical
standards in an effort to establish the conduct a news outlet re-
quires of its employees." 34
132. Id. at 1034. The Supreme Court upheld the securities law conviction on a 4-4
vote, and unanimously voted to uphold the mail and wire fraud conviction; consequently,
the opinion focused only on the mail and wire fraud portion of the case. The court men-
tioned the internal policy issue only in passing: "The Journal's business information that it
intended to be kept confidential was its property; the declaration to that effect in the em-
ployee manual merely removed any doubts on that score and made the finding of specific
intent to defraud that much easier." 108 S. Ct. at 321-22.
133. The original indictments in the case also charged the reporter with violating a
duty to readers to disclose his personal interest in the securities he wrote about. The gov-
ernment dropped that claim. 612 F. Supp. at 840 n.7. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion also initially filed a civil action against the reporter and others involved, basing it on
essentially the same rationale as the criminal case. Ultimately, the civil action was not pur-
sued. SEC Attacks Financial Press, THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Nov.IDec. 1984, at 4, 6.
In another case involving journalists and securities law, a federal appeals court reinstated
a civil action for damages suffered by shareholders as a result of publicity given to a firm by
a newspaper columnist. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 407 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 594
F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). The columnist had apparently made a practice of purchasing
stock in a company, writing about it, then reselling the stock. The court reasoned that the
columnist had become an "informal" investment adviser who had voluntarily assumed a
duty to disclose facts relating to his own lack of objectivity when writing about stocks in
which he had an interest. Id. at 1266-69. This rationale is somewhat unclear in light of Lowe
v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that the S.E.C. could not
enjoin the defendant from publishing an investment newsletter offering nonpersonalized ad-
vice and comment even though he had been convicted of violating several securities laws
while he was in the investment business. The court found that he could not be considered
an investment adviser under the terms of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 because his
publication didn't have the personalized character that identifies a professional adviser and
because his newsletter was exempt from the act's restrictions as a "bona fide newspaper,
news magazine or business or financial publication." Id. at 209.
134. R. Spellman, Financial Journalism Under Fire: the SEC and Newsroom Ethics
at 9-10 (paper presented to the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journal-
ism & Mass Communication, Aug. 6, 1986, Norman, Okla.). More recently, a defunct stock
brokerage firm has sued Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly, claiming that
the magazine and competing brokers conspired to force it out of business. Brought under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the suit alleges that the publication's editor spread the
word that Barron's would soon publish a negative article about plaintiffs, and that the edi-
tor did so in violation of the magazine's written policy prohibiting such disclosures. Creative
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What previously have been questions only of journalists' ethical
duties have become the subject of litigation in two other recent
cases. Both have involved issues of journalists' promises or repre-
sentations to sources in the process of gathering information.
In the first, convicted murderer Jeffrey MacDonald sued author
Joe McGinniss for fraud, breach of contract, breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress after learning the contents of Fatal Vision, a
book McGinniss wrote about MacDonald's murder case. 135 Mac-
Donald had given McGinniss exclusive access and cooperation so
that McGinniss could write the story of MacDonald's prosecution
for the murder of his family. He had also given McGinniss what
appeared to be a clear, written release from liability for whatever
McGinniss might write. But when Fatal Vision was not the sympa-
thetic account that MacDonald had expected, and when it became
clear that-without telling MacDonald-McGinniss had for some
time been convinced of MacDonald's guilt, MacDonald sued. Es-
sentially, he claimed that McGinniss lied to him when he promised
to write a "true" story about MacDonald's experience, and that he
misled MacDonald into thinking he was writing a sympathetic ac-
count and tricked him into continuing to cooperate with the
project.131
McGinniss' first problem was that his insurance company re-
fused to indemnify him, claiming that his policy covered only libel
and invasion of privacy and that MacDonald had alleged neither.
Consequently, McGinniss sued his insurer and won a declaratory
judgment concluding that MacDonald's allegations were in fact
grounded in libel, and that the insurance company was obligated to
cover McGinniss' expenses. 137 The trial judge, however, refused to
treat the case as "libel in disguise" and allowed the case to go to
trial on the theories of liability MacDonald alleged. A mistrial was
declared after the jury deadlocked at 5-1 in favor of MacDonald;
Securities, Inc. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., reported in the NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Fall 1987,
at 15. Late in 1988 the claim against the editor of Barron's was dismissed. See Judge Dis-
misses Charges Against Barron's Editor, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Dec. 17, 1988, at 20.
135. Judge, Fatal Vision: Truth and Betrayal, AM. LAW, Nov. 1987, at 77. See also
Kornstein, Fatal Vision: the Lawsuit, Nieman Rep., Winter 1987, at 4; and The Implica-
tions of MacDonald v. McGinniss (transcript of Firing Line, WQEX television broadcast,
Sept. 18, 1987, Southern Educational Communications Association) [hereinafter
Implications].
136. Implications, supra note 135; McGinniss v. Employers Reinsurance, 648 F. Supp.
1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
137. 648 F. Supp. at 1270.
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subsequently, the parties settled the case for $325,000.138 During
the trial, such figures as William F. Buckley and Joseph
Wambaugh testified on McGinniss' behalf and against imposing le-
gal liability for McGinniss' reportorial techniques. After the trial,
media attorney Floyd Abrams concluded that the case has "enor-
mous potential for choosing all the ground rules for journalism, not
just books-and not just books with a subject where you have an
arrangement of the sort that you did-but the entire news gather-
ing process.
1 39
In the second case, a jury awarded $700,000 to a source who
claimed breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation when
newspapers published his name after their reporters had promised
him confidentiality.1 0 The plaintiff had given reporters derogatory
information about a political candidate on the condition that he
not be named in connection with the story. But when editors
learned that the source was supporting the' opposing candidate,
they overrode the reporters' promise and, over the reporters' objec-
tions, named the source. The newspapers' motion for summary
judgment was denied when the judge refused to "adopt the pre-
mise that the First Amendment should operate to excuse news or-
ganizations from the consequences of a decision to publish when
that decision involves the breach of a valid contract or of the gen-
eral tort laws."" The court saw no constitutional issue: "This is
not a case about free speech, rather it is one about contracts and
misrepresentation."" At trial, several journalists testified on be-
half of the plaintiff; a journalism professor and a former editor also
testified as experts for plaintiff about journalistic ethics and the
importance of keeping promises of confidentiality.I"4 After the
trial, the plaintiff's lawyer was quoted as saying, "The promise of
confidentiality now has a legal backing as well as moral and ethical
138. 'Fatal Vision' Lawsuit Settled, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1987, at A21, col. 1.
139. Implications, supra note 135, at 20-21. For a case upholding a reporter's criminal
conviction for impersonating a government official in order to gather news, see New Jersey
v. Cantor, 221 N.J. Super. 219, 534 A.2d 83 (1987).
140. Confidentiality Ruled a Contract, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, July 30, 1988, at 11; Jury
Awards $700,000 for Breach of Confidentiality, Media L. Rep. (BNA), Aug. 2, 1988 (news
notes section) [hereinafter Jury Awards]; Cohen Awarded $700,000 in Newspaper Suit,
Minneapolis Star Tribune, July 23, 1988, at 1A, col. 5.
141. Cohen v. Cowles Media, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460, 1464 (D.C. Minn. 1987).
142. Id. Late in 1988 the judge denied the newspapers' motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and motion for new trial. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 15 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2288 (D.C. Minn. 1988).
143. Jury Awards, supra note 140.
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backing.""'
Taken together, then, these cases suggest that journalists, like
other professionals, are beginning to feel at least some legal pres-
sure on their voluntarily assumed duties." ' As has been the case
with other professionals, the courts have been generally reluctant
to expand legal duties based on what previously have been volun-
tary, moral duties. But notable exceptions to this reluctance have
begun to appear. 1 6
B. "Due Care"
In 1974 the United States Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc."17 that states could use negligence as a fault stan-
dard in libel suits by private figures. Consequently, private plain-
tiffs must show that the journalists who allegedly libeled them
failed to use "due care." That, in turn, has increased the relevance
of media ethics codes, internal policies and self-evaluations in libel
litigation and in other tort litigation as well."18 Journalists now face
the same argument as other professionals-that departure from
ethical norms and customs can be evidence of negligence.
There is little new in observing that the question of what consti-
tutes "due care" is highly significant. Professor David Anderson
144. Advice for Sources, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1988, at 40, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). One of the
defendant newspapers has subsequently adopted new guidelines on the use of anonymous
sources. The newspaper's editor acknowledged that having the new guidelines presents the
risk that they might be used against the newspaper in court some day, but said the paper
had balanced that risk against the need to have clear guidelines that everyone at the news-
paper could follow. Anonymous Sources, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 27, 1988, at 17.
145. For purposes of labor law, journalists have generally not been considered to be
professionals. See Express News Corp., 223 NLRB 627 (1976). But a recent federal district
court decision has held that some journalists may now be considered professionals and thus
exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Sherwood
v. The Washington Post, 677 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1988).
146. In contexts other than tort or contract law, there have been attempts-ultimately
unsuccessful-to make voluntary fair trial-free press guidelines legally binding on journal-
ists. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); State v. Simants, 194 Neb.
783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977). One court has
succeeded in making adherence to such guidelines a condition of courtroom access. See Fed-
erated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 984 (1982).
147. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). For a useful summary of state standards, see W. Hop-
kins, Negligence 10 Years After Gertz v. Welch, 93 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS (August 1985)
[hereinafter Hopkins].
148. The Statement of Principles of the American Society of Newspaper Editors has
reportedly been used in court in at least nine cases. See Sutherland, Journalist Groups
Arguing Over Need for Strong Ethics Codes, ASNE Bull., Dec. 1987, at 4 [hereinafter
Sutherland].
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was one of the first to point out that nontraditional, non-main-
stream news media could be at considerable risk if the courts
adopted a "responsible publisher" standard of due care: "The stan-
dard of care should be sufficiently particularized so that a pub-
lisher with an unpopular philosophy, an unorthodox journalistic
style, or limited resources will have its conduct measured against
the standards of similar publishers, rather than those of the estab-
lished conventional press."1 9 Others have warned that the require-
ment of fault-particularly negligence-may compel the courts to
provide a legal definition for journalistic responsibility. Such legal
definitions could then "be adaptable to other and more compre-
hensive systems of press regulation. 1 50 Meanwhile, it is conceiva-
ble that juries are beginning to perceive "the injuries caused by
'defective news' that is manufactured by corporate media enter-
prises as indistinguishable from the more palpable injuries caused
by any other defective product." ''
The concept of fault in libel law is reflected as much in the con-
cept of "actual malice "152 as in negligence. Actual malice requires a
determination of whether journalists actually knew they were be-
having irresponsibly and dangerously. 153 But negligence allows a
jury to speculate on how a hypothetical reasonable person or jour-
nalist would have behaved.154 Consequently, to the degree that eth-
ics statements, policies, self-evaluations and outside experts pro-
vide evidence of how a journalist ought to behave, they can become
relevant to a determination of negligence and may help a jury draw
inferences as to whether there is actual malice. For example, in
149. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 455-56 (1975).
See also Franklin, What Does 'Negligence' Mean in Defamation Cases? 6 COMM/ENT L.J.
259 (1984). In 1967, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court applied a "responsible publisher
test" in the context of libel actions brought by public figures. Public figures could recover
"on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). A majority of the court, however,
favored application of the actual malice standard in public-figure cases, as the majority
pointed out in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 336.
150. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 647 (1978). See also Bezanson, Confer-
ence Report-The Cost of Libel: Economic and Policy Implications 6-7 (Gannett Center for
Media Studies, 1986).
151. R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 12-13 (1986).
152. Actual malice is defined as publication of a libel "with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
153. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, at § 580A comment d.
154. Id. at §§ 298, 299A.
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Tavoulareas v. Piro,"' the plaintiffs were successful in compelling
the Washington Post to disclose speeches, articles and written
memoranda embodying the Post's or individual defendants' opin-
ions about journalistic standards. The plaintiff was also allowed to
depose the newspaper's former ombudsman to ask questions con-
cerning his "knowledge of journalistic practices and standards of
The Post during the time period roughly contemporaneous with
[publication of the allegedly libelous articles]."' 156
Two recent law review articles reflect just how relevant volun-
tary standards have become. Professor Lackland Bloom Jr., in an
exhaustive examination of proof of fault in media defamation ac-
tions, cites extensively to journalistic ethics codes and journalism
textbooks "when they bear on the issues [of fault] under discus-
sion.' 57 Bloom favors holding journalists, like doctors and lawyers,
to the standards prevalent in their profession. 58 He notes that:
Despite a great deal of diversity, many well-accepted practices and stan-
dards of conduct exist in journalism with respect to what a reasonably pru-
dent publisher does to achieve accuracy. The generally agreed upon objec-
tives of the profession are often stated in nonbinding ethical codes. The
more specific standards, practices, and customs frequently have been set
forth in training manuals for journalism students as well as working
journalists.'59
Professor Todd Simon has also favored a "malpractice" standard
of fault in negligence cases-holding journalists responsible only if
they depart from generally accepted journalistic practices. 6 ' But
Simon goes beyond Bloom by suggesting that a national standard
of care be adopted for journalists, and that the national standard
should be defined by journalistic ethics codes.16 ' He especially fa-
vors the codes of the American Society of Newspaper Editors and
the Society of Professional Journalists. 6 2 "Adherence to freely
adopted standards," he argues, "should present an unusually
strong libel defense.'1
6 3
155. 93 F.R.D. 35, 45 (D.D.C. 1981).
156. Id.
157. Bloom, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247
(1985) [hereinafter Bloom].
158.. Id. at 343.
159. Id. at 336-37.
160. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 452-53 (1984) [hereinafter Simon].
161. Id. at 472.
162. These two codes are reprinted in RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION, supra
note 1, at 289.
163. Simon, supra note 160, at 472.
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Noting the close relationship between the concepts of social re-
sponsibility and "due care", Simon asserts that "[j]ournalists have
a duty, and the code is a means toward the end of meeting that
duty."1 ' He concedes that codes may be somewhat imprecise, and
that adoption of a code-related standard is likely to lead to battles
of expert witnesses, but does not see these as problems.1"' "Appli-
cation of a malpractice standard might encourage public support
for licensing," he writes, "but that is a matter for future media
vigilance." '66
Why have commentators-including the RESTATEMENT SECOND
OF TORTS -67 -SO generally favored a "malpractice" standard of due
care? Apparently because of fear that juries will more easily find
against journalists if the relevant standard is something other than
a standard determined by the occupation itself. 68 Thus the battle
for supremacy between the "ordinary care" standard and the "mal-
practice" standard. The former would be determined merely by
reference to a hypothetical reasonable "person", the latter by ref-
erence to a hypothetical reasonable "journalist."
Courts in several states have adopted a "malpractice stan-
dard"-"the conduct of the reasonably careful publisher or broad-
caster in the community or in similar communities under the ex-
isting circumstances."'' 6 9 Others have favored ordinary negligence,
164. Id. at 477.
165. Id. at 477, 483. Simon also asserts that to some degree journalism standards and
ethical principles have "slipped into libel through the back door" - for example in the
context of the defenses of qualified privilege and neutral reportage. Id. at 470. Presumably,
these defenses recognize the value of accurate, fair and objective reporting on public mat-
ters; departure from these standards can destroy the defense.
166. Id. at 488.
167. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, at § 580B comment g.
168. For example, Professor Hopkins argues that a malpractice standard has two ad-
vantages: it eliminates concern that journalists' actions will be judged against a "sea of neg-
ligence," and it requires the actions of similar media to be compared under similar reporting
and publishing circumstances. Hopkins, supra note 147, at 18. It is relatively easy to find
examples of cases in which journalists have been saved from liability by testimony that they
have followed their own routine procedures. See, e.g., Dairy Barn Stores v. ABC, 15 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (court accepts defendants' own tape editor and
cameraman's statement of what "standard journalistic practice" is); Shapiro v. Newsday, 5
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff unable to show evidence of gross
irresponsibility where newspaper acted in accord with its standard procedures).
169. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76, 84 (1975). See also
Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626
P.2d 968, 976 (Utah 1981); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 317 S.E.2d
534, 537 (1984). One state has required evidence that the publisher has acted "in a grossly
irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering
and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties." Chapadeau v. Utica Ob-
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often explicitly rejecting a malpractice approach.17 ° As one court
put it, "[i]n a community having only a single newspaper, the
[malpractice] approach suggested would permit that newspaper to
establish its own standards. And in any community it might tend,
in 'Gresham's Law' fashion, toward a progressive depreciation of
the standard of care. 1 71 Or as another has asserted: "We find that
a jury in this state is as competent as any expert to form an intelli-
gent and accurate opinion as to whether a reporter should have
conducted additional investigations.
1 72
Even an ordinary negligence standard, however, can invite evi-
dence pertaining to ethical, customary journalistic behavior, or
about a news medium's own standard policies. Since an ordinary
care standard generally focuses on the behavior of a reasonable
person under the same circumstances:
[Tihe demands of a functioning newsroom should qualify as circumstances
that the reasonable person would consider relevant in a media defendant
case. The factfinder could and should consider the factors that essentially
dictate the content of professional standards.. . . Expert testimony would
be admissible to establish these factors. This testimony would provide the
factfinder with the professional benchmark." 3
Of course, evidence pertaining to newsroom policies and profes-
sional standards, though relevant, may not be decisive. Perhaps
more importantly, such evidence can damn as well as exonerate.
Those favoring a "malpractice" standard of journalistic fault may
wrongly assume that measuring journalists' behavior against cus-
tomary professional standards will generally work to journalists'
benefit.
Media defendants often attempt to introduce evidence as to pro-
server-Dispatch, Inc., 379 N.Y. 61, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 38 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1975). The same
standard has been applied to false light invasion of privacy. Fils-Aime v. Enlightenment
Press, 133 Misc. 2d 559, 507 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950, (App. Div. N.Y. 1986).
170. See, e.g., Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or. 434, 693 P.2d 35, 43
(1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623
S.W.2d 882, 886 (Ky. 1981); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Tenn.
1978).
171. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 184, 340 N.E.2d 292, 298-99 (1975).
172. Richmond Newspapers v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32, 42 (1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1997 (1988) (upholding jury verdict in favor of plaintiff school teacher).
The court concluded that a malpractice standard is inappropriate because: 1) there is an
inherent conflict of interest in allowing journalists to set their own standards where profit is
an important consideration in determining what is published; 2) there is not evidence that
journalists are sufficiently specialized so that a jury could not understand their work without
expert assistance; and 3) adoption of a malpractice standard might require the testimony of
a media expert before there could be recovery. Id. at __, 362 S.E.2d at 42-43.
173. Bloom, supra note 157, at 344.
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fessional standards or at least as to their own policies. Some courts
have refused to admit such evidence. For example, in Cramlet v.
Multimedia,"4 a suit for outrageous conduct by a woman whose
kidnapped child was cared for by employees of the Phil Donahue
show while the child's father was interviewed by Donahue, the de-
fense attempted to introduce testimony from "well known journal-
istic experts" as to the ethical appropriateness of such conduct.
The court refused to accept such testimony:
[[T]he defendant] submitted no written canons of journalism ethics that
purport to justify its actions in this case. In effect, the experts were to be
called to instruct the jury on the meaning of the First Amendment, a func-
tion of this court if applicable, and to tell 'war stories' about journalists'
experiences in other cases.. . . Nothing in the record suggests that any gen-
erally accepted or written standards of journalism apply here.' 7
One court has concluded that the standards of basic news report-
ing are simply common knowledge, requiring no expert testi-
mony.'76 Another has found arguments for admission of expert tes-
timony on professional custom and practice "not at all persuasive
when asserted defensively by a member of the profession," since
"negligence throughout a trade should not excuse its members
from liability.'
1 77
On the other hand, where courts do admit such evidence, the
174. 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1707 (D. Colo. 1985).
175. Id. at 1709. The court also refused to instruct the jury as to the difference be-
tween moral and legal duty, saying such instructions were argumentative and could have
confused the jury. Id. See generally Annotation, Libel and Slander: Necessity of Expert
Testimony to Establish Negligence of Media Defendant in Defamation Action by Private
Individual, 37 A.L.R. 4th 987 (1985); Ullmann, Teachers' Testimony in Libel, Media L.
Notes, April 1983, at 4; Journalism Profs Take Stand, COLUM. JOURNALIsM REV., July/Au-
gust 1981, at 7; The Rising Price of Profs, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July/August 1982, at
16. Of course, plaintiffs too may attempt to use experts to demonstrate legal fault, but they
have also run into difficulty. See, e.g., Brueggemeyer v. ABC, 684 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (affidavit by consultant in media analysis and communications research asserting that
her analysis of broadcast showed failure to use due care and reckless disregard is either
inadmissible or not probative of actual malice).
176. Greenberg v. CBS, 69 A.D.2d 693, 710, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1979). See also Kohn v.
West Haw. Today, 65 Haw. 584, 656 P.2d 79, 83 (1982) (lack of expert testimony in libel
case does not bar plaintiff's right to recovery unless evidence is of such technical nature that
laypersons are incompetent to draw their own conclusions without such evidence); and Rich-
mond Newspapers, 362 S.E.2d at 42-43 (court did not err in excluding evidence from expert
witness, a nationally known journalist, who testified as to appropriate standards for investi-
gative reporting and concluded that defendant did not depart from standards of accuracy
and fair play).
177. Schrottmann v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, 437 N.E.2d 205, 214 (1982). The court
also noted that "we hesitate to involve the courts in fashioning rules for journalistic prac-
tice." Id. at -, 437 N.E.2d at 215.
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results can be devastating. For example, in Kohn v. West Hawaii
Today,'17 a libel plaintiff was able to elicit testimony from the de-
fendant that he had deviated from his own routine standard of
care, and a jury verdict for the plaintiff was upheld.179 And in
Hyde v. City of Columbia,'8 0 a court considered a newspaper's un-
written policy of not naming sexual assault victims and noted that
"a deviation from that industry standard,. . . becomes evidence of
negligence.'' a8 Similar evidence has been harmful to media defend-
ants even in determinations of fault at the level of actual malice. 182
Closely related is the issue of the risks inherent in self-critical
evaluation by journalists. That question, though not yet the sub-
ject of substantial litigation, did arise prominently in the West-
178. 65 Haw. 584, 656 P.2d 79 (1982).
179. Id. at 590, 656 P.2d at 82-83. See also Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325
S.E.2d 713 (1985), cert. denied sub nor., Fleming v. Moore, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985) and Port
Packet Corp. v. Lewis, 473 U.S. 905 (1985) (upholding libel judgment for plaintiff where
evidence of negligence included showing that long-standing custom of newspaper was vio-
lated in preparing story); Mazart v. New York, 109 Misc. 2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y.
Ct. Cl. 1981) (campus newspaper's lack of procedures or guidelines to verify authorship of
letters to editor is evidence of gross irresponsibility). But see Ryder v. Time, 3 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1170 (D.D.C. 1977) (granting summary judgment where defendant followed
standard procedures of normal publishing practice).
180. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. 1982).
181. Id. at 269 n.25.
182. See, e.g., Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying motion
for summary judgment and referring to possible deviation from fact-checking procedure
specified in defendant's own handbook for researchers); News Publishing Co. v. DeBerry,
171 Ga. App. 787, 321 S.E.2d 112 (1984) (affirming verdict for public official plaintiff where
journalism professor testified as to professional standards and gave opinion on hypothetical
situation involving such standards); Kerwick v. Orange County Publications, 53 N.Y.2d 625,
420 N.E.2d 970, 438 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1981) (summary judgment for newspaper reversed where
editor admitted that his conduct had not met standards of the profession in information-
gathering and dissemination as he understood them); Frisk v. News Co., 361 Pa. Super. 536,
523 A.2d 347, 351 (1986) (upholding libel verdict for borough solicitor and council president
where there is evidence of "clear departures from acceptable journalistic standards"). See
also Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 264 Md. App. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972), for a dissent argu-
ing vigorously that a jury might have found actual malice where evidence showed that the
editor was not familiar with the ethical standards of the American Society of Newspaper
Editors, where the editor was familiar with legal expert's recommendations that formalized
policies should be used to promote accuracy, but where reporter was nevertheless given no
specific policies to follow. 264 Md. App. at -, 286 A.2d at 159-60. The majority, however,
affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant. Conversely, evidence that a
defendant has followed its customary editorial procedures has been treated as crucial in
demonstrating absence of actual malice. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 692 F.2d
189 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers,
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Henslee v. Monks, 571 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1977)
(affirming jury verdict for broadcaster where news director for another station testified as to
defendant's adherence to high professional standards in preparing allegedly libelous story).
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moreland v. CBS 183 libel case. The issue was whether to admit as
evidence CBS's internal investigation of the making of the docu-
mentary over which Westmoreland sued. Although the court ulti-
mately ruled most of the report inadmissible on grounds of rele-
vance, it rejected CBS's argument that the entire report should be
inadmissible: "To establish a rule forbidding [admissibility of such
reports] would deprive injured claimants of one of the best and
most accurate sources of evidence and information."' 84 The court
noted that even if the report showed that the network's internal
rules and guidelines were violated, such violation has no tendency
to prove actual malice.18 5 It is not clear whether the outcome would
have been different had Westmoreland had to prove only
negligence.
Another question is whether external evaluations of media con-
duct could be used to establish standards of due care. Professor
Ronald Farrar, addressing this issue in the context of news coun-
cils, has concluded that the risk of such use is slight. 8 The worri-
some scenario for journalists would be that as a news council de-
velops a body of principled decisions, such decisions could be
drawn on by litigants as evidence of what is generally accepted as
appropriate journalistic conduct in a variety of situations.187 De-
parture from such standards would then arguably become
negligence.
Farrar argues that such fear is overstated because no single stan-
dard is likely to become decisive in determining journalistic fault,
and because courts are unlikely to accept a "professional" standard
developed by a group consisting in part of nonmembers of the pro-
fession. 8 8 Such an argument, however, may underestimate the fact
183. 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
184. Id. at 68. See also Bruck, The Mea Culpa Defense: How CBS Brought on the
Westmoreland Suit-and Sacrificed One of Its Own, AM. LAW., Sept. 1983, at 82; Weiss,
Who's Watching the Watchdog?: Self-Evaluative Privilege and Journalistic Responsibility
in Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 7 COMM/ENT L. J. 149 (1984). Weiss favors a self-evaluative
privilege for the media on grounds that it is more likely to encourage self-evaluation and
responsiveness to public opinion than is compelled disclosure. Id. at 173.
185. 601 F. Supp. at 69.
186. Farrar, News Councils and Libel Actions, 63 JOURNALISM Q. 509, 515 (1986)
[hereinafter Farrar].
187. A former chairman of the Minnesota News Council has been quoted as saying
that the council is "developing a body of thoughtful, case-by-case essays on newspaper ethi-
cal problems"-a sort of "common law with respect to newspaper ethics .. " Remarks of
Judge C. Donald Peterson, quoted in Kennedy, Processing the Beefs, QUILL, Oct. 1977, at
26, 27.
188. Farrar, supra note 186, at 515.
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that negligence in any given case is often a highly situational con-
cept that does not depend on universal standards. Further, many
courts do not apply a journalistic malpractice standard at all, so it
may not matter that news council members are nonprofessionals.
To a large degree, of course, the question is moot since, with the
notable exception of the Minnesota News Council, the news coun-
cil movement appears dead. Some newspapers do, however, have
ombudsmen or reader contact editors who investigate reader com-
plaints and publish their findings and conclusions.189 If a reader
complaint ultimately leads to a lawsuit, it would seem conceivable
that at least the facts developed by the ombudsman could be dis-
coverable by the plaintiff as might the facts uncovered by any type
of internal investigation.190
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This article purposely has used the words "professional" and
"ethics" without precisely defining them, because however one de-
fines them, it appears that social responsibility in mass communi-
cation has legal ramifications. Mass communicators, like other pro-
fessionals, are feeling increased pressure for the recognition of new
legal duties; and voluntary professional standards are becoming
ever more relevant in litigation. In part, these ramifications are a
result of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the concept of "fault"
in libel law during the past two decades and especially since the
Gertz case. But they are also an inevitable result of mass commu-
nicators' increasing concern with social responsibility. Conse-
quently, in mass communication as in other professions, the dis-
tinction between moral and legal responsibility has become
increasingly fuzzy.
Media litigants have themselves contributed to this result by ar-
guing in some cases for consideration of professional standards and
in other cases for the irrelevance of professional standards. They
189. See, e.g., Glasser & Ettema, A Census of North American Newspaper
Ombudsmen (Preliminary Findings, Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and Law,
University of Minnesota, 1985); Ettema & Glasser, Public Accountability or Public Rela-
tions? Newspaper Ombudsmen Define Their Role, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 3 (1987).
190. For the proposition that facts are discoverable in the context of self-evaluation,
see Rosario v. New York Times, 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denying discovery of
certain self-evaluative documents in context of complaint regarding newspaper's affirmative
action policies). See also Ramada Inns v. Dow Jones, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1872 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1986) (denying request to depose attorneys for newspaper libel defendant in at-
tempt to discover that attorneys and editors had discussed journalist's allegedly shoddy re-
porting practices, but noting that facts being sought may yet be discoverable).
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have argued against recognition of new legal duties even when
those duties are drawn from the media's own ethical standards.
Yet they have attempted to use some of those same standards and
customs in an effort to avoid liability for negligence. At best there
is risk of confusion when one attempts to use one's own profes-
sional standards as a yardstick against which to measure one's le-
gal responsibility.
Should communicators turn their backs, then, on social responsi-
bility? Is it too risky a concept to embrace? Certainly not. First, it
is important not to lose a sense of perspective. A 1985 survey of
188 daily newspapers found that the number of editors who be-
lieved that their legal vulnerability would decrease in light of hav-
ing written standards outnumbered those who feared an increase
in vulnerability, and that reducing legal vulnerability was a major
reason cited by editors for adoption of written standards."" The
survey found that written standards are "well entrenched and un-
likely to be changed, diluted, or abolished in the near future,"19'
and concluded that "some newspaper editors and media attorneys
overestimate the current and potential threat of the offensive use
of these standards and underestimate the advantage of their defen-
sive use."'193 Ultimately, it might be argued, what editors do is
more important than what legal doctrine might say.
Second, there is the practical argument that even in the absence
of written (or widely known but unwritten) standards of behavior,
evidence regarding a defendant's normal custom or procedure will
be heard in evidence anyway. That is, it may be just as risky not to
have explicit policies as it is to have them. Since having them may
sometimes work to one's advantage, there is no disincentive to be-
ing voluntarily responsible.
191. Project, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their Character, and Their
Legal Implications, 72 IOWA L. REV. 637, 649, 653 & 690 (1987) (authored by Lynn
Weckham Hartman) [hereinafter Hartman]. Thirty-four percent believed having written
standards would decrease their vulnerability; 26 percent believed standards would increase
vulnerability. The former group's primary reason was belief that the newspaper could use
the standards in libel suits to show that it had taken steps to insure fairness and accuracy;
the latter group's fear was that plaintiffs' lawyers would misuse the standards in libel cases.
Id. See also Barnes, Keep Your Eyes Open; You'll Know Unethical Behavior When You
See It, ASNE Bull., Dec. 1987, at 10; and Does Your Newspaper Have a Code of Ethics?
ASNE Bull., Dec. 1987, at 8 (including remarks from one editor who reported having news-
paper's ethics code subpoenaed twice).
192. Hartman, supra note 191, at 651.
193. Id. at 656. Although the study found that written standards are indeed relevant
to the issue of fault in libel cases, it also concluded that written standards were infrequently
used in litigation. Id.
1989 273
Duquesne Law Review
Nevertheless, it might be useful to rethink the question of how
desirable a professional malpractice standard is in determining le-
gal responsibility. Journalists, for example, may still fare better in
the long run under an ordinary negligence standard precisely be-
cause it does not so directly encourage invocation of universal pro-
fessional standards. Further, an ordinary negligence standard does
not so directly imply that journalists have special legal or constitu-
tional status. Special status claims flow naturally from assertions
that journalism serves vital societal functions, and such assertions
lead easily to confusion of moral and legal duties.
One can easily imagine cases-especially where a malpractice
standard of fault has been adopted-in which plaintiffs may be far
happier than defendants to introduce professional standards. This
is precisely why courts that have rejected a malpractice standard
may in fact be the media's friends, not their enemies. Even in such
malpractice cases, journalists may be wise to try to define specific
standards as narrowly as possible or to emphasize that there is no
consensus about universal standards of good journalism.
In addition, journalists and other mass communicators might
profitably become more cognizant of the vocabulary of rights and
duties and of how easily legal and moral concepts become con-
fused. 94 Some communicators are becoming cognizant of this
problem. For example, after long and intense debate, the Society
of Professional Journalists has rejected efforts to add specific en-
forcement provisions to its code of ethics, and voted to delete lan-
guage from its code calling on journalists to "actively censure and
try to prevent violations of these standards." '95 A central concern
194. See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text. Of course, not all commenta-
tors agree that legal and moral obligations ought to be kept carefully distinct. Glasser, for
example, has argued that:
From the perspective of an affirmative understanding of the First Amendment, in
short, the journalist's principal and overriding responsibility is to assure the integrity
of the press by seeing to it that the press is at all times free to conduct itself in
accordance with its highest ideals. At the very least, this means that a free press is a
press free to act with regard for-and with reference to-the general welfare of its
community; it means, as the American Society of Newspaper Editors recognized more
than half century ago when it promulgated its 'Canons of Journalism,' that freedom
of the press means freedom 'from all obligations except that of fidelity to the public
interest.'
Glasser, Press Responsibility and First Amendment Values, in RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM,
supra note 1, at 93.
195. Self-Censure Clause Dropped, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Nov. 21, 1987, at 9. The so-
ciety has not, however, moved away from the idea of written standards of professional con-
duct. The organization voted also to insert the following language into the code:
Adherence to this Code is intended to preserve and strengthen the bond of mutual
274 Vol. 27:237
Media Malpractice
was that "any code of ethics that purports to be more than aspira-
tional might well be considered a set of organizational or associa-
tional rules or even a set of legal rules; enforcement changes the
very nature of such a code."' 6 The Radio Television News Direc-
tors Association has taken similar action, dropping a censure provi-
sion in its code because of "the legal problems that codes of ethics
present in libel and privacy cases. ' ' 197 The American Society of
Newspapers Editors has considered scaling down or eliminating its
Statement of Principles, but has not actually done so. 198
Such actions imply recognition of a distinction between respon-
sibility and accountability-a distinction Professor Louis Hodges
has argued is of great importance to the mass media:
Responsibility has to do with defining proper conduct; accountability with
compelling it. The former concerns identification; the latter concerns power.
The issue of responsibility is a practical one the answer to which can come
from an examination of society's needs to know and the press's abilities to
inform. The issue of accountability is a political one the answer to which
can come from an analysis of centers of power-government, media organi-
zations, public influence. 99
In practice, the two concepts are far less easily separated. A pri-
mary challenge is to make certain that issues of accountability do
not become the central determinant of responsibility-a challenge
at which neither the courts nor the media appear to have
succeeded.
Professor Timothy Gleason has pointed out that newspaper pub-
lishers in the nineteenth century used the metaphor of the press as
a public "watchdog" in order to gain special protection for newspa-
pers in the common law of libel.200 But the concept implied obliga-
tions as well as rights. Today, the obligations may be catching up
trust and respect between American journalists and the American people. This soci-
ety shall by programs of education and other means encourage individual journalists
to adhere to these tenets and shall encourage journalistic publications and broadcast-
ers to recognize their responsibility to frame codes of ethics in concert with their
employees to serve as guidelines in furthering these goals.
Id. See also A Matter of Ethics, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Nov. 22, 1986, at 9.
196. Wills, Why the Board Said "No" to Censure, QUILL, June 1987, at 47, 49.
197. Sutherland, supra note 148, at 4-5 (quoting the chairman of the RTNDA Ethics
Committee).
198. Id. at 4.
199. Hodges, Defining Press Responsibility: A Functional Approach, in RESPONSIBLE
JOURNALISM, supra note 1, at 14.
200. Gleason, The Watchdog in Nineteenth Century Libel Law: Common Law Con-
cept of Freedom of the Press 10 (Paper presented to the AEJMC Law Division, AEJMC
annual meeting, August 1986).
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with the rights.
